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MATTHEW C.  WAXMAN 
Syria, Threats of Force, and Constitutional War 
Powers 
In this Essay, Professor Matthew Waxman argues that debates about 
constitutional war powers neglect the critical role of threats of war or force in 
American foreign policy. The recent Syria case highlights the President’s vast legal 
power to threaten military force as well as the political constraints imposed by 
Congress on such threats. Incorporating threats into an understanding of 
constitutional powers over war and peace upends traditional arguments about 
presidential flexibility and congressional checks—arguments that have failed to keep 
pace with changes in American grand strategy. 
 
In August 2013, the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad launched a 
major sarin gas attack against opponents and civilians inside Syria, flagrantly 
crossing the “red line”—widely interpreted as an implicit threat to intervene 
militarily in response to chemical weapons use—that President Obama had 
previously declared and reiterated in public remarks.1 Amid widespread 
suggestions that American credibility was now on the line, President Obama 
responded on August 31 with two simultaneous announcements: first, he had 
decided that the United States should respond militarily with limited strikes 
against Syrian government targets; and, second, notwithstanding his insistence 
that he had constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief to take that action 
unilaterally, he would seek congressional approval to do so.2 The Obama 
Administration then began an intensive lobbying campaign to convince 
 
1.  See Michael R. Gordon, Aim of U.S. Attack: Restore a ‘Red Line’ That Became Blurred, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 29, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/30/world/middleeast/aim-of-a-us 
-attack-on-syria-sharpening-a-blurred-red-line.html. 
2.  Remarks on the Situation in Syria, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1-3 (Aug. 31, 2013). 
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skeptical legislators and the public that following through on the proposed 
military strike was necessary not only to deter further chemical weapons 
attacks by Syrian government forces, but to deter the acquisition and use of 
weapons of mass destruction by other hostile regimes and terrorist 
organizations.3 
Almost two hundred years earlier, another President drew a red line. In his 
1823 address to Congress, President Monroe declared to European powers that 
the United States would oppose any efforts to colonize or reassert control in 
the Western Hemisphere.4 Monroe’s cabinet had been divided over the 
wisdom of this implied threat—which the United States at the time lacked 
capability to enforce without relying on British naval supremacy—but they 
unanimously understood that military action against any European power that 
crossed the line would constitutionally require congressional authorization.5 
Monroe’s successor, John Quincy Adams, later faced complaints from 
opposition members of Congress that Monroe’s proclamation had exceeded his 
constitutional authority and had usurped Congress’s by committing the United 
States—even in a non-binding way—to resisting European meddling in the 
hemisphere.6 
A lot changed during those two hundred intervening years. As a strategic 
matter, the United States grew after World War II into a military superpower 
with global interests and global security commitments. As a legal matter, the 
President effectively asserted vast powers to use military force since then, too, 
and neither Congress nor the courts have generally stood in his way. Every 
student of American constitutional war powers learns that the Framers split 
them between the political branches: the President is the chief executive and 
Commander-in-Chief, but Congress has the power to raise and support a 
military and to declare war. Most scholars interpret the original intent of this 
division as giving Congress responsibility for deciding if and when the United 
States should use military force (except for some narrow exceptions like 
repelling an invasion) and giving the President responsibility for managing the 
military operations authorized by Congress. At least as interpreted by the 
 
3.  See Address to the Nation on the Situation in Syria, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2 (Sept. 
10, 2013). 
4.  See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801-1829, at 
207-09 (2001). 
5.  See 6 JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, COMPRISING PORTIONS OF 
HIS DIARY FROM 1795 TO 1848, at 202-08 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Philadelphia, J.B. 
Lippincott & Co. 1875). 
6.  See CURRIE, supra note 4, at 210-18. 
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executive branch and as exercised in practice, the President now wields vast 
unilateral discretion to use military force to protect U.S. interests.7 
This basic story of American constitutional war powers—divided authority 
evolving with the vast expansion of U.S. military power into unilateral 
presidential authority—gives rise to several major debates among scholars and 
commentators about the functional merits of different constitutional 
allocations of power.8 One major dispute concerns what allocation of power 
best helps to avoid unnecessary and costly wars. “Congressionalists”—or those 
who favor tight legislative checks on the President’s authority to use force—still 
rely heavily on logic, invoked by James Madison at the time of the Founding, 
that the more flexibly the President can use military force, the more likely it is 
that the United States will find itself in wars; better, therefore, to clog 
decisions to make war with legislative checks.9 Their calls for reform usually 
involve narrowing and better enforcement (by all three branches of 
government) of purported constitutional requirements for congressional 
authorization of presidential uses of force, or revising and enforcing the War 
Powers Resolution or other framework legislation requiring express 
congressional authorization for military actions.10 Modern “presidentialist” 
legal scholars—or those who favor vast unilateral executive authority to use 
force—usually respond that rapid action is a virtue, not a vice, in exercising 
 
7.  On this evolution, see generally JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: 
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 3-10 (1993) (describing the 
original intention of the constitutional framers to place the power to go to war with 
Congress, and the shift in the exercise of that power in the Cold War to the President); and 
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 1-25 (1973) (recounting early 
debates over the proper balance of executive and legislative war powers). But see John C. 
Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 
84 CALIF. L. REV. 167 (1996) (arguing that the original understanding of the Constitution 
supports a very broad presidential authority to use force). 
8.  For a summary of these debates, see generally STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 11-51 (2013). 
9.  See ELY, supra note 7, at 3-4; Jules Lobel, The Relationship Between the Process and Substance of 
the National Security Constitution, 15 YALE J. INT’L L. 360, 366-74 (1990) (reviewing HAROLD 
HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-
CONTRA AFFAIR (1990)); Michael J. Glennon, The Gulf War and the Constitution, FOREIGN 
AFF., Spring 1991, at 84, 87-88. 
10.  See, e.g., ELY, supra note 7, at 115-131; Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and 
the Constitution: Iraq and the Crisis of Presidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 447, 496-500 
(2011); Glennon, supra note 9, at 99-101; Deciding to Use Force Abroad: War Powers in a 
System of Checks and Balances, CONST. PROJECT (2005), http://www.constitutionproject.org 
/pdf/28.pdf; see also LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 261-81 (2d ed. 2004) 
(discussing frequently raised objections to the War Powers Resolution). 
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military force.11 Especially as a superpower maintaining global interests and 
facing global threats, presidential discretion to take rapid military action—
wielded by a branch endowed with what Alexander Hamilton called 
“[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch”12—best protects American interests. 
Meanwhile, almost no attention has been devoted to an issue highlighted 
by the Syria case: How does constitutional allocation of power affect the 
United States’s ability to deter conduct inimical to American interests or to 
resolve foreign crises by threatening force—that is, by communicating through 
words and deeds the possible future use of armed violence to affect the 
behavior of other actors, usually other states?13 This lack of attention to threats 
of force and constitutional powers is ironic because, since World War II, such 
threats have formed the backbone of U.S. grand strategy. The United States 
has relied heavily on the manipulation of risk to deter aggression or other 
actions by adversaries, to coerce or compel certain actions by other states or 
international actors, to reassure allies, and to pursue other political designs 
under the shadow of armed threats.14 When wars or large-scale force actually 
have been used, it has been because a prior policy or strategy failed—for 
instance, because deterrent threats were insufficiently credible, or crises 
involving U.S. threats of force escalated in ways that were difficult to control. 
In this regard, most of the time that U.S. military power is “used”—and often 
when it is most successful—it does not manifest as a war or major military 
engagement at all. If we are worried ultimately about avoiding wars through 
 
11.  See, e.g., JOHN YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND 401-02 (2009); Eugene V. Rostow, President, 
Prime Minister or Constitutional Monarch?, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 740, 741 (1989). 
12.  THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 128 (Alexander Hamilton) (Richard Beeman ed., 2012). 
13.  For some prior discussion of these issues, see Samuel Issacharoff, Political Safeguards in 
Democracies at War, 29 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 189, 197 (2009) (arguing that democracies 
may have more credibility than non-democracies in signaling intentions during crises, 
thereby helping to avoid war); and Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional 
Design, 115 YALE L.J. 2512, 2526-38 (2006) (recognizing the importance of signaling in 
functional assessments of war powers allocations). 
14.  See generally BARRY M. BLECHMAN & STEPHEN S. KAPLAN, FORCE WITHOUT WAR: U.S. 
ARMED FORCES AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT (1977) (analyzing the use of military force or the 
threat thereof for political ends); DANIEL BYMAN & MATTHEW WAXMAN, THE DYNAMICS OF 
COERCION: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LIMITS OF MILITARY MIGHT (2002) 
(examining U.S. use of coercion as a geopolitical tool); JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, STRATEGIES OF 
CONTAINMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY DURING 
THE COLD WAR 90 (rev. ed. 2005) (“World order, and with it American security, had come 
to depend as much on perceptions of the balance of power as on what that balance actually 
was.”). 
syria, threats of force, and constitutional war powers 
301 
 
constitutional design, we should be thinking about threats of war and the 
Constitution. 
In a forthcoming article, titled The Power to Threaten War,15 I consider in 
detail the relationship between constitutional powers and strategies of 
threatened force. This Essay highlights several critical aspects of that 
relationship, especially as illustrated in the Syria case. In particular, it shows 
that the President’s power to carry out threats is only half the story; the other 
half is how distributions of constitutional power between the political branches 
help or impede the President’s ability to issue effective threats. 
When President Obama remarked in announcing his Syria decisions that 
although he had the legal authority to take action without congressional 
authorization, “our actions will be even more effective” by obtaining it,16 he 
was probably correct in two narrow senses: yes, presidents have relied on 
similar authority in the past,17 and yes, if Congress affirmatively backed his 
actions at this stage, this military action would likely be more potent. But 
would commitment—political commitment or even legal commitment—to 
stronger congressional control over future U.S. decisions to intervene generally 
enhance the credibility and effectiveness of American threats of force? It is such 
future effects of any U.S. action, as the President himself acknowledged, that 
are critical to American strategic interests, and they are also critical to 
understanding the practical consequences of how constitutional war powers are 
allocated. 
i .  constitutional powers and threats of force 
These days it is usually taken for granted that—whether or not he can make 
war unilaterally—the President is constitutionally empowered to threaten the 
use of force, implicitly or explicitly, through diplomatic means or shows of 
 
15.  123 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2014). 
16.  Remarks on the Situation in Syria, supra note 2, at 2. 
17.  Harold Koh argues that this action would be consistent with prior executive branch 
precedent. See Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention (Part I: 
Political Miscues and U.S. Law), JUST SECURITY (Sept. 26, 2013, 4:30 AM), 
http://justsecurity.org/2013/09/26/koh-syria. But see Jack Goldsmith, How Administration 
Lawyers Are Probably Thinking About the Constitutionality of the Syria Intervention (And a Note 
on the Domestic Political Dangers of Intervention), LAWFARE (Aug. 24, 2013, 11:59 AM), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/08/how-administration-lawyers-are-probably-thinking 
-about-the-constitutionality-of-the-syria-intervention-and-a-note-on-the-domestic 
-political-dangers-of-intervention (arguing that this would be an unprecedented extension 
of executive power). 
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force. It is never seriously contested whether the President has full, 
independent authority to, for example, proclaim that the United States is 
contemplating military intervention in response to a crisis, or whether the 
President may move substantial U.S. military forces to a crisis region or engage 
in military exercises there. 
From a constitutional standpoint, the President’s power to threaten force is 
at least as broad as his power to use it. One way to think about it is that the 
power to threaten force is a lesser-included element of presidential war powers; 
the power to threaten to use force is simply a secondary question, the answer to 
which is bounded by the President’s vast, primary authority to use force in 
protecting U.S. national interests. Depending on how a particular threat is 
communicated, it is likely to fall within even quite narrow interpretations of 
the President’s inherent foreign relations powers to conduct diplomacy or his 
express Commander-in-Chief power to control U.S. military forces—or some 
combination of the two. A President’s verbal warning, ultimatum, or declared 
intention to use military force, for instance, could be justified as merely 
exercising his role as the “sole organ” of U.S. foreign diplomacy (at least so 
long as he does not formally declare war), conveying externally information 
about U.S. capabilities and intentions.18 A president’s movement of U.S. troops 
or warships to a crisis region or elevation of their alert level could be justified as 
merely exercising his day-to-day operational control over forces under his 
command.19 
This virtually unchecked executive authority to threaten force or war has 
affected U.S. security and foreign policy in ways often neglected by legal 
scholars, who tend to focus predominantly on actual wars and other hostile 
engagements of U.S. forces abroad. The Korean and Vietnam Wars are 
generally considered the most salient events of the Cold War for understanding 
constitutional allocations of war powers, yet during that time frame presidents 
 
18.  See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936); see also Dep’t of 
the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988) (noting the Supreme Court has “recognized ‘the 
generally accepted view that foreign policy was the province and responsibility of the 
Executive’” (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293-94 (1981))); Saikrishna B. Prakash & 
Michael D. Ramsey, Foreign Affairs and the Jeffersonian Executive: A Defense, 89 MINN. L. 
REV. 1591, 1592-93 (2005) (arguing that diplomatic authority is vested in the executive 
branch); Phillip R. Trimble, The President’s Foreign Affairs Power, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 750, 755 
(1989) (noting that “the President has the exclusive power of official communication with 
foreign governments”). 
19.  See Training of British Flying Students in the United States, 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 58, 62 (1941) 
(Robert H. Jackson, Att’y Gen.). At various times, though, Congress has placed statutory 
geographical restrictions on the deployment of U.S. forces. See Ackerman & Hathaway, 
supra note 10, at 456. 
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also unilaterally wielded threats of nuclear war to deter Soviet aggression, to 
bargain, and to reassure allies, and they unilaterally (or sometimes with 
congressional backing) resorted to small-scale shows of force on dozens of 
occasions in pursuit of U.S. strategic interests. In the 1990s, U.S. presidents 
wielded threats of force against dictators or militia leaders in places such as 
Iraq, Haiti, and Bosnia—with varying effectiveness and prior to actual U.S. 
military operations that attracted the attention of legal scholars. While legal 
scholars have recently been focused on whether U.S. actions in Iraq and against 
al Qaida affiliates reflect an imperial executive, presidents have been wielding 
without direct legal constraint the threat of U.S. military force in East Asia—
for example, to deter North Korean aggression and signal to China and restive 
U.S. allies American intentions to maintain regional security balances—in a 
manner that is sometimes consistent with defense treaties and sometimes 
outside them.20 
The power to threaten force is significant not only for its influence in 
provoking or defusing crises, and perhaps causing or preventing major wars, 
but also because threats put American credibility and reputation for resolve on 
the line, and thereby alter the interests and stakes involved in carrying them 
out. Constitutional scholars often make much of the fact that Congress 
ultimately authorized the 1991 Persian Gulf war and declined to authorize the 
1999 Kosovo intervention—two of the most significant U.S. military 
adventures following the end of the Cold War. It is important, however, to 
understand those congressional decisions as a very late, not early, stage of a 
decision tree. The President’s ability to threaten force was critically important 
at earlier stages in determining whether that final stage would even occur at all, 
and what policy payoffs would be associated with different choices.21 Once 
President George H.W. Bush placed hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops in 
the Persian Gulf region and issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein in 1990, 
the credibility of U.S. threats and assurances to regional partners were put on 
the line.22 In threatening force against Serbian President Slobodan Milošević 
over the 1999 Kosovo crisis, President Clinton and allied leaders altered the 
 
20.  See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 13-14 (2011), http://www.jcs.mil/content/files/2011-02/020811084800_2011_NMS 
_-_08_FEB_2011.pdf; Jane Perlez, Cancellation of Trip by Obama Plays to Doubts of Asia Allies, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/05/world/asia/with-obama 
-stuck-in-washington-china-leader-has-clear-path-at-asia-conferences.html. 
21.  Cf. Marc Trachtenberg, History Teaches, YALE J. INT’L AFF., Sept. 2012, at 23, 29-30 (arguing 
that war should be viewed as an outcome of an extended political process that unfolds over 
time). 
22.  See Glennon, supra note 9, at 93. 
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strategic stakes by putting perceptions (among both allies and adversaries) of 
collective NATO resolve on the line.23 
In the Syria case, a major argument by executive branch officials lobbying 
Congress to back military action was that failure to act would have deleterious 
effects on U.S. capacity to deter hostile actions by Iran, North Korea, and other 
possible adversaries.24 They also argued that failure to act, now that the 
President had stated his intention to do so, would undermine U.S. allies’ 
confidence in American commitments to their defense.25 Many of the strongest 
congressional supporters of military action made similar arguments to sway 
their colleagues.26 
Especially when taken together, these factors—the president’s vast legal 
authority to make threats, the importance of threats to American security 
strategy after World War II, and the difficulty of climbing down from threats 
once they are made—might mean that the shift in powers of war and peace 
since World War II from Congress to the President has been even more 
dramatic than usually supposed, at least in terms of how formal congressional 
checks are exercised. Political scientists have often observed, however, that 
Congress wields considerable political clout over the President’s decision 
whether to threaten force—and in ways that differ from Congress’s ability to 
affect ultimate decisions to use force or ongoing military operations. 
 
23.  See Henry A. Kissinger, Doing Injury to History, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 5, 1999, at 38. 
24.  See Chuck Hagel, U.S. Sec’y of Def., Statement on Syria Before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
(Sept. 3, 2013), available at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1802; 
John Kerry, U.S. Sec’y of State, Opening Remarks Before the United States Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations (Sept. 3, 2013), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/09 
/212603.htm. 
25.  See Noah Bierman, Kerry Urges Congress to OK Strike, BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 1, 2013, 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2013/09/01/secretary-state-john-kerry-says 
-waiting-congress-makes-syria-response-more-powerful-cites-new-evidence-chemical 
-attack/AJ9VpYr05WbvjxZfznGTRJ/story.html; Mira Rapp-Hooper, Do Chemical Weapons 
Threaten US Extended Deterrence in Asia?, DIPLOMAT BLOG (Sept. 13, 2013), 
http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/09/13/do-chemical-weapons-threaten-us 
-extended-deterrence-in-asia. 
26.  See Jonathan Martin, Vote on Syria Sets Up Foreign Policy Clash Between 2 Wings of G.O.P., 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/03/us/politics/syria-vote-sets 
-up-foreign-policy-clash-in-gop.html; Juliet Eilperin, McCain Says Rejecting Syria Resolution 
Would Be ‘Catastrophic,’ WASH. POST: POST POLITICS (Sept. 2, 2013, 5:29 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/09/02/mccain-says 
-rejecting-syria-resolution-would-be-catastrophic. 
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Whereas most lawyers usually begin their analysis of the President’s and 
Congress’s war powers by focusing on their formal legal authorities, political 
scientists usually take for granted these days that the President is—in 
practice—the dominant branch with respect to military crises and that 
Congress wields its formal legislative powers in this area rarely or in only very 
limited ways. Yet a major school of thought holds that Congress nevertheless 
wields significant influence over decisions about force, and that this influence 
extends to threatened force, so that Presidents generally refrain from threats 
that would provoke strong congressional opposition. Even without any serious 
prospect for legislatively blocking the President’s threatened actions, Congress 
under certain conditions can loom large enough to force Presidents to adjust 
their policies; when it cannot, congressional members can oblige the President 
to expend lots of political capital.27 
Political opponents in legislative bodies have a ready forum for registering 
dissent to presidential policies of force through such mechanisms as floor 
statements, committee oversight hearings, resolution votes, and funding 
decisions.28 These official actions prevent the President from monopolizing 
political discourse on decisions regarding military actions and thereby make it 
difficult for the President to depart too far from congressional preferences with 
regard to wielding threats of force.29 
Political opponents within a legislature also have few electoral incentives to 
collude in an executive’s bluff, and they are capable of expressing opposition to 
a threatened use of force in ways that could expose the bluff to a threatened 
adversary.30 Even without exercising formal legislative powers, members of 
Congress can shape public debate in ways that affect perceptions of U.S. 
resolve abroad. As William Howell and Jon Pevehouse explain, “Congress 
 
27.  WILLIAM G. HOWELL & JON C. PEVEHOUSE, WHILE DANGERS GATHER: CONGRESSIONAL 
CHECKS ON PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 223 (2007); see also DOUGLAS L. KRINER, AFTER THE 
RUBICON: CONGRESS, PRESIDENTS, AND THE POLITICS OF WAGING WAR 285 (2010) (noting 
that “members of Congress have historically engaged in a variety of actions from formal 
initiatives, such as introducing legislation or holding hearings that challenge the President’s 
conduct of military action, to informal efforts to shape the nature of the policy debate [about 
military conflict]”). 
28.  See KENNETH A. SCHULTZ, DEMOCRACY AND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY 59-62 (2001). Some legal 
scholars emphasize these levers of congressional influence over war decisions, too. See, e.g., 
Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 411, 468 (2012). 
29.  See SCHULTZ, supra note 28, at 57. 
30.  See id. at 95-96. 
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matters, and matters greatly,” not just to the decision to strike militarily but “to 
a nation’s ability to credibly convey resolve to enemies and allies alike.”31 
The strength of these congressional political constraints on presidential 
threats of force is not well understood, and the Syria case demonstrates their 
limits. It is impossible even to know with certainty Congress’s position on 
whether to threaten Syria with military force over chemical weapons at the 
time President Obama drew a red line—as a general matter, the sprawling 
institutional structure of Congress and rarity of definitive collective 
pronouncements make that impossible.32 President Obama’s difficulty in 
securing congressional authorization to strike after the August 2013 Syrian gas 
attacks suggests that the President may have underestimated congressional 
wariness.33 
An important question for understanding the practical consequences of war 
power allocations, then, is whether greater legal constraints on presidential 
decisions to use force—such as a much stricter requirement for legislative 
authorization or stronger enforcement of the War Powers Resolution—would 
indirectly limit even further the President’s actual flexibility in making and 
wielding threats. Perhaps the marginal and indirect effect of stronger 
congressional control of force would be substantial. However, the political 
system already achieves some degree of interbranch checking. 
i i .  constitutional checks and credible threats 
Whereas legal scholars are usually consumed with the internal effects of 
war powers law on actors within the U.S. government, the Syria case 
highlights a question about their possible external effects: how, if at all, does 
the legal allocation of power between the President and Congress affect the 
credibility of U.S. threats among adversaries, allies, and other international 
actors? In prescriptive terms, if the President’s power to use force is linked to 
his ability to threaten it effectively, then any consideration of the impact of war 
powers reform on policy outcomes and long-term interests should include the 
important secondary effects on deterrent and coercive strategies—and on how 
 
31.  HOWELL & PEVEHOUSE, supra note 27, at xi. 
32.  Cf. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 28, at 438-47. 
33.  See Peter Baker, Russian Proposal Could Offer Obama Escape from Bind, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/10/world/middleeast/surprise-russian-proposal 
-catches-obama-between-putin-and-house-republicans.html; Mark Landler & Jonathan 
Weisman, Obama Delays Syria Strike to Focus on a Russian Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/11/world/middleeast/syrian-chemical-arsenal.html. 
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U.S. legal doctrine is observed and understood abroad.34 Would stronger 
requirements for congressional authorization to use force reduce a president’s 
opportunities for bluffing, and, if so, would this improve U.S. coercive 
diplomacy by making ensuing threats more credible? Or would it undermine 
diplomacy, including deterrence of adversaries and reassurance of allies, by 
taking some threats off the table as viable policy options? Would stronger 
formal legislative powers with respect to force have significant marginal effects 
on the ability to signal abroad dissent within Congress, beyond that already 
resulting from open American political discourse? 
Intuitively, greater congressional veto power over the use of force would 
seem generally to undermine the credibility of threats. For this reason, it has 
long been assumed that democracies are at a disadvantage relative to 
autocracies when it comes to threats of force and saber-rattling bargaining 
contests under the shadow of possible war. Quincy Wright speculated in 1942 
that autocracies “can use war efficiently and threats of war even more 
efficiently” than democracies,35 especially democracies like the United States, in 
which vocal public and congressional opposition may undermine threats.36 
Additional, formal legal powers over war or force in the hands of Congress 
would, it might seem, further disable the President from wielding threats 
effectively, because opponents and other players in the international system 
might doubt not only his willingness but his ability to carry them out. This was 
a common policy argument during the War Powers Resolution debates in the 
early 1970s. Eugene Rostow, an advocate inside and outside the government 
for executive primacy, remarked during consideration of legislative drafts that 
serious restrictions on presidential use of force would mean that, in practice, 
“no President could make a credible threat to use force as an instrument of 
deterrent diplomacy, even to head off explosive confrontations.”37 This view 
holds that the merits of Madisonian “clogging” with regard to waging 
 
34.  One of the few pieces of legal scholarship to engage in this sort of analysis is Nzelibe & Yoo, 
supra note 13 (arguing that credible signaling is an important element of rational 
constitutional design of war powers). For a critique, see Paul F. Diehl & Tom Ginsburg, 
Irrational War and Constitutional Design: A Reply to Professors Nzelibe and Yoo, 27 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 1239 (2006). 
35.  QUINCY WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 847 (1942). 
36.  See id. at 842. 
37.  Eugene V. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEX. L. REV. 833, 838 
(1972). 
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eighteenth century wars are liabilities with regard to deterring twentieth and 
twenty-first century wars.38 
The Syria case would seem to bear out these concerns. By giving Congress 
a vote, the President appears not only to have tied his own hands in carrying 
out his threat, but to have tipped off American rivals and partners that 
congressional support for new military actions (for which the President might 
also seek congressional authorization) is generally frail. 
On the other hand, some recent strands of political science have called into 
question the value of presidential flexibility in wielding threats. Some of this 
work concludes that the institutionalization of political debate in democracies 
makes threats to use force rare but especially credible and effective in resolving 
international crises without resort to actual armed conflict. 
In other words, recent arguments turn some old claims about the strategic 
disabilities of democracies on their heads. Whereas it used to be generally 
thought that democracies were ineffective in wielding threats because they are 
poor at keeping secrets and their decision-making is constrained by internal 
political pressures, a current wave of scholarship in political science accepts this 
basic description but argues that these democratic features are really strategic 
virtues.39 If that view is correct, a question for constitutional scholars is how, 
specifically, legal doctrine and allocations of power strengthen or weaken these 
features. 
Some political scientists argue that democracies are less likely to bluff 
because transparency makes it harder to do so.40 To the extent that adversaries 
and allies understand this, threats will seem more serious than bluster. 
Informational asymmetries also increase the potential for misperception and 
thereby make some wars more likely; war, consequentially, can be thought of 
in these cases as a “bargaining failure,” and greater transparency about 
American policy preferences may help avoid unnecessary escalation of crises.41 
For the reasons discussed in the previous section, legislative politics may 
already contribute to this credibility-enhancing and conflict-avoiding 
 
38.  See William P. Rogers, Congress, the President, and the War Powers, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1194, 
1210-11 (1971) (arguing that requirements of congressional authorization to use force would 
undermine presidential flexibility and the necessary credibility of threats). 
39.  See Marc Trachtenberg, Audience Costs: An Historical Analysis, 21 SECURITY STUD. 3, 4-5 
(2012) (explaining and critiquing these arguments). 
40.  See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 13, at 197. 
41.  SCHULTZ, supra note 28, at 24. 
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transparency.42 Perhaps stricter legal requirements for congressional approval 
of military action would push even more information about American political 
and policy inclinations to the surface and into the open. For example, turning 
more media attention to congressional opinion and elevating the significance of 
congressional hearings or other maneuvers might make it more difficult to 
conceal or misrepresent American preferences about war and peace with regard 
to specific crises or threats. Moreover, especially if presidentialists are correct 
about the importance of flexibility to credibility, in a hypothetical world of very 
stringent congressional force-authorization requirements, Congress might be 
inclined to delegate or pre-authorize some discretion back to the President. 
As mentioned above, political transparency stemming from congressional 
debate about Syria strikes likely weakened the President’s coercive leverage 
abroad rather than strengthening it. But, for those interested in whether 
stronger inter-branch checks are inherently disadvantageous to strategies of 
threatened force, an important question is whether, ex ante, a legal 
requirement for congressional approval to launch strikes would have caused 
the President to be more cautious in drawing a red line to begin with and, if he 
did so, would have made any threat backing it especially credible in the eyes of 
intended audiences abroad. 
conclusion: the constitution and american grand 
strategy 
The recent Syria case has inspired much discussion about constitutional 
war powers and much discussion about the credibility of threats. Those two 
conversations should be combined because the issues are tightly linked.43 
Lawyers think “war powers” are about making war or conducting military 
operations. They therefore examine wars and military operations to describe 
how war powers are exercised and they often defend various interpretations of 
these powers with functional arguments about how best to wage war or 
conduct military operations. Focusing on decisions to use force—the actual 
engagement of military operations in armed violence—and formal legal 
constraints on them misses the many decision points that lead up to them. War 
 
42.  Id. at 60; see also David P. Auerswald, Inward Bound: Domestic Institutions and Military 
Conflicts, 53 INT’L ORG. 469, 494-98 (1999) (detailing congressional moves and some of 
their effects on coercive diplomacy during the Bosnian crisis). 
43.  For commentary that combines both conversations, see Rapp-Hooper, supra note 25; 
Ganesh Sitaraman, Credibility and War Powers, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. (forthcoming Dec. 
2013). 
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powers decisions—in a practical sense, not a formal sense—occur earlier along 
the foreign policy decision tree than is generally acknowledged or understood 
in legal debates. Because the United States is a superpower that plays a major 
role in sustaining global security, its ability to threaten war is in some respects 
a much more policy-significant constitutional power than its power to actually 
make war. 
Despite the intense emphasis on it in discussions of foreign policy, 
knowledge of how states acquire, maintain, or lose credibility to use force 
remains severely limited.44 In thinking about the future of American 
constitutional war powers, legal scholars need to update their thinking about 
the strategic virtues of deliberative checks versus presidential flexibility to 
better account for what is known and is not known about these phenomena. 
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